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6 August 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT : Notes on the [] Planning Guidance Paper

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1. Whatever way the intelligence community or the Defense portion of it is restructured as a result of the Fitzhugh Report, many of its components will be rearranged elements of the organizations which coordinated and agreed on this Planning Guidance paper. In a way it could represent a means of continuity and an assertion of common beliefs across a major reshuffle period. In another way, used by the Director and by the new ASD/I, it could represent a touchstone to establish the validity and adequacy of new intelligence missions and new resource allocations.

2. This document consciously took as one of its chief guides the President's foreign policy statement of February 1970. In many ways, the force of the whole Fitzhugh Report is toward the same end objectives as in the statement: a lowered overseas profile, a reduced US military responsibility, a retraction of US commitments of all kinds and a contraction of the areas of prime US policy interest. In this context, the Planning Guidance and the Fitzhugh Report are contemporaries, responding to similar policy directions.

3. It follows from this that the accomplishment of the proposed actions in the Planning Guidance paper should assist the implementation of the Fitzhugh Report by describing agreed goals and expectations, minimizing dislocations between new DOD arrangements and the rest of the community, responding to some of the criticisms of intelligence in the Fitzhugh Report and helping to focus new DOD organizations on missions and responsibilities more appropriate to the President's policy and the new order, rather than on roles carried over from the Cold War and a broad spread of contingencies of widely varying plausibility.

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4. Accordingly, proposed action A--a new statement of national intelligence objectives and priorities--should be the first order of business. It would provide an occasion for the definition of much of what the DOD reorganization is about and an opportunity for active DCI/CIA leadership in an otherwise confused time. As Action A progressed, it would sweep up Action B--developing an interface between policy guidance and intelligence programming. Efforts to set priorities should refer frequently to policy makers for the choices most appropriate to their problems. The DCI could inaugurate this action in USIB with USIB sponsorship and direction. Concurrently (as part of Action B), the DCI, with USIB's endorsement, could circulate the Planning Guidance paper to policy-setting leaders for their comments and suggestions as to what intelligence could do to help in dealing with the foreign policy problems foreseen in the paper. Responses to this move would set guidelines for the recommended customer-need survey which probably would contact lower levels among users.

5. Action C--the coordination of intelligence R&D--might have to be postponed until the DOD R&D community sorts itself out after the Fitzhugh reshuffle.

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6. Action D--analysis of HUMINT by the NIRB--would refute or confirm the Fitzhugh allegation that HUMINT is of little use and that Defense Attaches do more harm than good. Action here might be deferred until the statements of objectives and priorities are developed. Then HUMINT (I hate the word) could be judged on its contributions to those objectives. Moreover, it may be well to wait and see what kind of a HUMINT effort emerges from the shake-up and consolidation into the SIGINT-oriented Defense Security Command (DSC)--though it can also be said that a judgment on HUMINT might help size what the DSC's effort should be.

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8. Action F--intelligence resources on the Free World--is likewise pertinent to the President's paper and to the operational impacts on US forces abroad inherent in the Fitzhugh Report. Certainly, the apparent allocation of [] of our intelligence dollars to Free World targets in FY-71 should be re-examined in the light of a force reorganization which would collapse three commands--Lant, South and Strike--into one--those three being the sources of much of the requirements for Free World information for their contingency plans. A major thrust of the Fitzhugh Report reflects the President's policy for a much diminished role for military power in policy execution overseas. Consequently, the contingencies and intelligence support for them ought to diminish too, and the slice of resources assigned to cover them should shrink. It should be noted that while [] may seem small, it is the 2nd biggest bloc of area resource allocations; []

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[] While a Free World Allocations study is a good idea in itself, the Fitzhugh Report, as its implementation proceeds, provides a good occasion to apply its results.

9. Actions G, H and I are more "domestic" than the others, being effort to equip the NIRB and the community better for the other tasks proposed. G and H--models of future overseas deployment patterns and a systems capability inventory--are two sides of a coin and necessarily should advance together. G will of course be strongly influenced by the impacts of the Fitzhugh Report on the U&S commands and the application of the criteria for activities "organic to those commands". Changes in command missions will alter associated intelligence needs and resources and so affect capabilities to be enumerated in an inventory. Success in both undertakings would be greatly assisted by joint and explicit sponsorship by the DCI and the ASD/I through the NIRB. Because so many elements of the community and overseas activities would be involved, it might be advisable to launch this work with a joint DCI-ASD/I "directive" with wide distribution and a clear priority.

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10. Action I--exploitations of unclassified materials--is already well launched, inspired originally by the cutback of the Defense (now Federal) Research Division of the Library of Congress. The study could be completed in a month. It is a useful venture; [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] resuming access to periodicals and open literature of all sorts through the Library's virtually invulnerable subscription and acquisition services.

11. Action J--contingency plans and their intelligence resource implications--will need to wait until the Fitzhugh recommendations settle down. The force structures and contingencies that emerge from this should then be scrutinized as this action proposes. ASD/I would be the logical sponsor for this undertaking, and he should find such an examination of real use to him in his resource programming.

12. To sum up, the Planning Guidance and the Fitzhugh Report have a reciprocating effect on each other; early steps on the Fitzhugh recommendations can shape the outlines of these proposed actions, which in turn can influence later stages in the Fitzhugh implementations. Taken together, both documents may well represent a blueprint of a new environment for intelligence, one in which the DCI can take a commanding role, and the Planning Guidance paper, given its broad acceptance in the community as it was, can be an authoritative guide for both the new Defense intelligence structure and the community's adjustments to it. By his personal endorsement of the document and his backing of the proposed actions, particularly Action A, the DCI can provide leadership and continuity through what promises to be a very turbulent but constructive time for all of us.

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